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I. INTRODUCTION
Would you pay $101,355 for a $23,263 Toyota Camry? If you built
that car using only Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) parts
from Toyota, that is how much it would cost.1 Even more shocking,
the $101,355 would not even include paint or the labor required to
assemble the vehicle.2 But a recent Illinois case—Avery v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3—has effectively mandated
the use of OEM parts when insurance companies repair damaged
vehicles.4

* Candidate for J.D., Florida State University, 2001; B.A., Oral Roberts University,
1997. I would like to thank Professor Angela Toman for her instruction and support. I also
thank Lisa Midkiff, Eric Dickey, Michael Sjuggerud, and the Law Review staff for their
assistance. This Note is dedicated to Karen Rearden, my mother, for her endless
encouragement, love, and guidance.
1. See Press Release, Alliance of Am. Insurers, Rebuilt Camry Costs 4x Retail Price,
Proving OEM Auto Parts Are $7.2 Billion Rip-Off, Alliance Study Finds (July 30, 1999)
[hereinafter AAI, Rebuilt Camry].
2. See id.
3. No. 97-L-114, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999), available in WESTLAW, 1999 WL 955543
(Count I); No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 1022134 (Count II), appeal docketed, No. 5-99-0830 (Ill.
App. Ct. Dec. 21, 1999), and motion for direct appeal denied, No. 88833. Count I pertained
to plaintiffs’ breach of contract action. See 1999 WL 955543, at *1. Counts II and III
addressed plaintiffs’ claims under an Illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business
practices statute. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *1.
4. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *5.
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Not suprisingly, Avery has sent shock waves through the
automobile insurance community and could cause the amount of
insurance premiums to skyrocket. As one journalist noted:
The stakes in this battle are enormous, given the estimated 35
million automobile accidents that occur in the U.S. each year. The
crash parts used to repair wrecked vehicles cost about $9 billion,
money that is paid largely by insurers and financed by the
premiums paid by all motorists.5

This Note will first analyze the potentially groundbreaking case of
Avery before discussing its ramifications for automobile insurance
companies and their policyholders. Avery has engendered an
important debate regarding the use of non-Original Equipment
Manufacturer parts (non-OEM), and it may lead to significant
premium increases for the insurance-consuming public. This Note
will analyze the issues associated with the use of non-OEM parts,
and upon reaching the conclusion that their use should be retained,
it will offer a possible solution to the problem that can be
implemented extrajudicially and within the existing legislative
scheme by the insurers themselves. In the event that the insurers
choose not to implement the proposed solution, the Florida
Legislature should consider mandating the proposed solution.
II. AVERY V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.
The plaintiffs in Avery were State Farm policyholders who
claimed that by repairing their wrecked vehicles with non-OEM
automobile parts rather than using OEM parts, State Farm failed to
return their cars to “pre-loss condition” as required by their
insurance policies.6 On October 4, 1999, the jury rendered a verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that State Farm breached its
contracts with the plaintiffs, and the jury awarded the plaintiffs $456
million.7 In addition, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $130
million—the amount of direct savings that State Farm realized from
its practice of using non-OEM parts.8 The trial court also awarded
the plaintiffs $600 million in punitive damages for violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.9
Totaling almost $1.2 billion, the judgment in Avery is reportedly the

5. See Ralph Vartabedian, Losers in State Farm Case May Be Consumers, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at W1, 1999 WL 26187710.
6. See Avery, 1999 WL 1022134, at *1. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text
for an in-depth discussion of the difference between OEM and non-OEM parts.
7. See 1999 WL 955543, at *1.
8. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *4.
9. See id.; see also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1-12 (West 1997).
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largest judgment ever against an insurance company in the United
States.10
State Farm filed a notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate
Court.11 In addition, State Farm filed a motion for direct appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court, requesting the state supreme court to
bypass the intermediate appellate court.12 The Illinois Supreme
Court denied State Farm’s motion for direct appeal.13 Consequently,
the case remains on appeal at the Illinois Appellate Court.
The plaintiffs benefited from a number of the trial court’s
generous rulings. Foremost was the trial court’s decision to certify
the plaintiff class as comprised of the following members:
All persons in the United States, except those residing in
Arkansas and Tennessee, who, between July 28, 1994, and
February 24, 1998, (1) were insured by a vehicle casualty
insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm and (2) made a
claim for vehicle repairs pursuant to their policy and had nonfactory authorized and/or non-OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturer) “crash parts” installed on their vehicles or else
received monetary compensation determined in relation to the cost
of such parts. Excluded from the class are employees of Defendant
State Farm, its officers, its directors, its subsidiaries, or its
affiliates.
In addition, the following persons are excluded from the class:
(1) persons who resided or garaged their vehicles in Illinois and
whose Illinois insurance policies were issued/executed prior to
April 16, 1994, and (2) persons who resided in California and
whose policies were issued/executed prior to September 26, 1996.14

As a result of the court’s decision to certify the plaintiff class, the
plaintiffs did not have to show that each individual class member
suffered harm.15 The plaintiffs were “not required to prove which
members of the class suffered an economic loss or the extent of any
individual’s loss.”16 Nor were plaintiffs required to prove the preloss
condition of any individual vehicle or that any specific non-OEM part
was of lesser quality.17 Based on these rulings, it was highly probable
10. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. at 1, Avery v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). This brief was filed in support of State
Farm’s motion for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The motion was denied.
11. See Notice of Appeal, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, (Ill.
App. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) The appeal was filed on December 7, 1999, with the Fifth District
Appellate Court.
12. See Motion of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. for Direct Appeal, Avery v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). The motion was filed January 20, 2000.
13. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000).
14. Avery, 1999 WL 1022134, at *1, *2.
15. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 16, Avery (No. 88853).
16. Id.
17. See id.
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that some members of the class would recover without any showing
of loss.
Prohibiting State Farm from informing the jury that its
policyholder group owned the company likely impacted the jury’s
decision as well.18 Although the plaintiffs were permitted to suggest
that State Farm was motivated by greed, the court prohibited State
Farm from refuting their suggestion by showing that the
policyholders owned the company and benefited from its financial
success.19 In addition, the trial court barred insurance regulators
from testifying on behalf of State Farm concerning debates in state
legislatures about the quality of non-OEM parts.20 Reportedly, jurors
were also not allowed to hear “any of the evidence about the benefits
of auto part competition.”21
The trial court precluded State Farm’s damages expert from
testifying.22 Thus, the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Iqbal Mathur, offered the
only expert testimony jurors heard.23 Dr. Mathur asserted two
theories for measuring damages: a “specification” theory and an
“installation” theory.24 Under the “specification” theory, the insured
suffered damages if a non-OEM part was specified on the repair
estimate, even if non-OEM parts were not installed on the vehicle.
Yet, upon cross-examination, Dr. Mathur conceded that this theory
made “no economic sense.”25 Under the “installation” theory, those
insureds who had non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles were
further entitled to “installation” damages.26 Dr. Mathur found that
damages could be anywhere between $658,450,000 and
$1,211,500,000, yet he conceded that “his estimate could be too high
by as much as $1 billion.”27
In its brief requesting the Illinois Supreme Court to bypass the
usual appellate process by directly considering the appeal, State
Farm expressed concern there would be a significant adverse effect
on insurance consumers “if insurance companies stop[ped] specifying
non-OEM repair parts.”28 Furthermore, the brief addressed three
main issues it alleged would warrant direct review by the Illinois

18. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 17, Avery (No. 88853).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. David Reich-Hale, When Car Costs Less Than Sum of Its Parts, Auto Competition
Is Critical, Insurers Contend, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (PROPRTY & CASUALTY), Jan. 3, 2000, at
3, 3.
22. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 18, Avery (No. 88853).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 18.
26. See id. at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5.
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Supreme Court: (1) the class should not have been certified, (2) the
punitive damages award should not have been awarded, and (3)
direct review is in the public’s best interest.29 But in denying review,
the Illinois Supreme Court simply stated “Motion by appellant for
direct appeal to this Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b).
Motion Denied.”30 This decision was a surprising move by the state
supreme court, since the amount of money involved will certainly
lead the losing party at the appellate level to file an appeal with the
Illinois Supreme Court.
State Farm fears that southern Illinois will become a magnet for
similar class action lawsuits.31 This fear is supported by several
similar lawsuits that have already been filed against automobile
insurers in the wake of the Avery decision. Indeed, the same group of
lawyers that represented the Avery plaintiffs has filed similar
lawsuits against other insurers in the same county where Avery was
decided.32
The first of these, Paul v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,33 alleged
that the insurance companies engaged in a “uniform and common
practice of using inferior, imitation crash parts in the repair of their
policyholder’s vehicle.”34 The second case, Hobbs v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,35 was filed less than one month
after the Avery decision. The plaintiffs in Hobbs named a number of
automobile insurers as defendants including State Farm, CNA,
Allstate, Safeco, Liberty Mutual, USAA, and GEICO. These plaintiffs
contended that the insurers:
knowingly specified inferior non-OEM crash parts, falsely claimed
that these non-OEM crash parts were of like kind and quality, and
jointly founded and financed the Certified Auto Parts Association
(“CAPA”) as a front to conceal their conduct and to deceive
policyholders into believing that parts of like kind and quality to
OEM parts were being used to satisfy policyholder claims.36

The plaintiffs are again seeking class action status.37 David Snyder,
Assistant General Counsel for the American Insurance Association,
recently summed up the decision by stating, “the filing of the Hobbs

29. See id. 21, 28, 31.
30. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000).
31. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 33-34, Avery (No. 88853).
32. See id. at 7.
33. No. 99-L-995 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). The complaint was filed October 13, 1999.
34. Complaint at 1, Paul (No. 99-L-995).
35. No. 99-L-1068 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). The complaint was filed Nov. 2, 1999.
36. Complaint at 1, Hobbs (No. 99-L-1068); see also infra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text for further discussion of CAPA.
37. See Complaint at 8, Hobbs (No. 99-L-1068).

548

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:543

lawsuit is evidence that this litigation will have the effect of creating
a monopoly in what is now a competitive parts industry.”38
The significant impact of the Avery decision has extended beyond
the borders of the United States and into Canada.39 As of January 3,
2000, a “class action style lawsuit [had] been filed in Quebec against
Group Desjardins, ING Canada (the second largest auto insurer in
Canada) and AXA Canada (seventh largest) relating to their use of
non-OE[M] parts.”40 Two American insurance companies that sell
automobile insurance in Canada, State Farm and Liberty Mutual,
have ceased using non-OEM parts on vehicles repaired in Ontario,
Canada.41 Furthermore, trade associations are petitioning Transport
Canada to prohibit the importation of non-OEM parts, some of which
come from American companies.42
State Farm, Country Companies, and Nationwide have recently
ceased repairing wrecked vehicles with non-OEM parts.43
Nationwide’s decision also extended to its Nationwide affiliates:
Allied, Farmland, and Scottsdale Insurance Companies.44 A
Nationwide representative issuing the non-OEM decision said this
was made in response to the “current environment surrounding non OEM crash parts.”45 As a result, during the first month of the
suspension of non-OEM parts, State Farm has incurred costs of $4.8
million more than expected to repair insured vehicles.46
In contrast, several other major insurers including Allstate,
Farmers, Progressive, USAA, Travelers, SAFECO and Hartford
continue to use non-OEM parts in the wake of Avery.47 According to
an Allstate representative, Allstate will continue to use non-OEM
parts “where appropriate.”48 USAA recently reviewed its policy
surrounding non-OEM parts, but the company contends that this is
not in response to the Avery trial or decision.49
Avery has reached into U.S. financial markets as well. The stock
price of Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., the largest non-OEM

38. Curtis Anderson, Seven Auto Insurers Named in Illinois Aftermarket Parts Suit,
CLAIMS, Dec. 1999, at 12, 12.
39. See Aftermarket Parts Lawsuits Hit Canada, COLLISIONWEEK (Quandec Corp.),
Jan. 3, 2000, http://www.collisionweek.com (visited Oct. 16, 2000).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Nationwide Insurance Suspends Use of Non-OEM Crash Parts, at
http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/nationwide1199.html (last modified Nov. 5, 1999).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853).
47. See Joe Frey, Is the State Farm Verdict Enough To Change Industry Practice?, at
http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/statefarmup10994.html (visited Mar. 29, 2000).
48. Id.
49. See id.
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parts distributor in the U.S., was $21.63 in January 1999.50 That
price fell to $10.88 per share during the course of the trial as
investors got cold feet, then dropped to $8.50 the day following the
decision.51 In October, 2000, the price of Keystone stock bottomed out
at $4.56 per share.52 As of January 23, 2001, the stock had risen to
$8.00 per share.53 If this trend continues, many non-OEM parts
manufacturers may be driven out of business. If that occurs,
consumers will end up in the same situation that they were in during
the 1970s, when automobile manufacturers monopolized repair
parts.54
What plaintiffs’ attorneys are hailing as a victory for consumers
may ultimately be the sole reason for an increase in automobile
insurance rates.55 In discussing what consumers should expect rates
to be in the future, Robert Hurns, an analyst with the National
Association of Independent Insurers, recently stated, “[Y]ou will end
up paying higher premiums.”56 Insurance companies use non-OEM
parts to minimize insurance costs. Their rationale is based on simple
economic principles: reduce costs and pass those savings on to
consumers.
Other insurance industry analysts believe that if the Avery verdict
is upheld, there will be little, if any, effect on future insurance rates.
One such analyst predicted that insurance policyholders with State
Farm would see only a 1% increase in their insurance rates as a
result of Avery.57 This assertion is made in part because the appeal
may overturn the verdict or will at least delay payment. The
assertion also takes into account the time required for the insurance
companies to file rate increases with each state insurance
department, further delaying the effects of any automobile rate
hikes.58
50. See Joseph Ascenzi, State Farm Auto Parts Dispute Dings Manufacturer, BUS.
PRESS, Oct. 18, 1999, at 2, 1999 WL 7171730.
51. See id.
52. See Search of Nasdaq Index Quotes, http://quotes.nasdaq.com (select “charting”;
enter “KEYS”in ADD A SECURITY FIELD; select appropriate interval; click on chart).
Keystone had not suffered any major business setbacks, so it seems likely that the drop
was a result of concern after the Avery decision. See Joseph Ascenzi, After-Market Auto
Parts To Bear Keystone Brand: Earnings Drop 79% After Court Orders Repair Shops To
Use Manufacturer Parts, BUS. PRESS, Nov. 20, 2000, at 1, 2000 WL 7814823.
53. See Search of Nasdaq Index Quotes, supra note 52.
54. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, AUTO MANUFACTURERS WANT A MONOPOLY ON
REPLACEMENT CAR PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, MONOPOLY].
55. See Matthew L. Wald, Consumers May Be Losers in a Verdict on Auto Parts, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at C1.
56. Id.
57. See Joe Frey, Higher Auto Premiums Because of State Farm Verdict? Think Again ,
at http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/statefarmup10992.html (last modified Oct. 6,
1999).
58. See id.
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Recently the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.) released
figures that indicate Avery has had an effect on the insurance
industry.59 An increase of 1.5% occurred in 2000, which is the first
increase in three years.60 The increase for 2001 is expected to be
between 2% and 4%.61 These figures show a significant change as
1998 and 1999 experienced rate decreases for the first time since
1973.62 Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, I.I.I. Vice President and Chief
Economist, stated that “[t]he effective prohibition on the use of
generic parts of like kind and quality in the repair of damaged
vehicles [as a result of Avery] is a factor that could ultimately add $4
to $5 billion annually to the cost of automobile insurance.”63
III. RELATED CASES
The Avery decision is a drastic shift in how courts traditionally
view the use of non-OEM parts. A survey of cases across the United
States shows that cases similar to Avery have either been dismissed
or have been decided in favor of the insurance-company defendants.
Arizona.—An Arizona Superior Court dismissed a similar case
after the Avery decision. In Kenger v. Government Employees
Insurance Co.,64 Judge Norman Davis ruled that Mr. Kenger did not
prove that the radiator installed in his Honda was inferior or that he
suffered damage.65
Florida.—A trial court in Florida dismissed a similar case, which
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in April of 1999. 66
The appellate court stated, “The economic loss rule bars causes of
actions in tort between parties to a contract unless there is proof of
personal injury or property damage independent of a breach of the
contract.”67 The trial court found no economic loss or breach of
contract, prompting the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.68
Massachusetts.—A Superior Court in Norfolk County granted
partial summary judgment to the defendant insurance company on a
diminished value claim.69 The court found nothing in the insurance
59. See Press Release, Insurance Info. Inst., Auto Insurance Rates Expected to Rise,
Court Decision and Litigation End Recent Declines, I.I.I. Reports (Dec. 4, 2000),
http://www.iii.org (visited Jan. 10, 2001).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. No. CV9901522 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2000).
65. See id.
66. See Clayton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See Roth v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 98-3551, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept.
3, 1999).
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policy that precluded the use of non-OEM parts. Additionally, in
denying a second motion for summary judgment, the court stated,
“statutes and regulations in the Commonwealth mandate such usage,
no doubt to reduce costs of repair and consequently, premium costs to
consumers.”70 The court denied the insurance company’s summary
judgment motion, acknowledging that there was an issue of material
fact regarding the quality of the non-OEM fender in question.71
Pennsylvania.—The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County also sustained an insurance company’s preliminary objection
to the plaintiffs’ class action complaint.72 The insurance company
“disput[ed] that any contractual duty was owed to the plaintiff to pay
for that automobile’s diminished value.”73 According to the court,
“Pennsylvania follows the reasonable expectation doctrine in
determining the scope of an insurance contract.”74 The court reasoned
that plaintiffs’ “expectations are not reasonable in light of the current
common practice in Pennsylvania.”75 Hence, the court dismissed the
class action complaint with prejudice.76
Tennessee.—In Murray v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,77 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.78 The court cited
two reasons. First, common questions of fact and law did not exist.79
Second, the court stated that there were potential conflicts among
the class representatives that might not be resolvable.80 As a result,
State Farm policyholders in Tennessee were not a part of the Avery
class action suit.81 The plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class
certification.82
Texas.—The plaintiffs in Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.83 made essentially the same allegations as the Avery
plaintiffs. Although the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the insurance companies, the insureds had abandoned their breach of
70. Roth v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 98-3551, slip. op. at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 31,
2000).
71. See id.
72. See Munoz v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 9906-2855, slip. op. at 1 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Nov. 23,
1999).
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 4.
76. See id. at 6.
77. No. 96-2585 Ml/A, slip op. (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 1997).
78. Id. at 1.
79. See id. at 15 (holding that there could not be common questions of fact because the
determination of inferiority of non-OEM parts “would require the testing of thousands of
individual crash parts”).
80. See id. at 20.
81. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 12, Avery (No. 88853).
82. See id.
83. 9 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App. 2000).
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contract claims.84 Instead, the court decided that the insurance
companies were not required “to pay for the new OEM parts in the
satisfaction of all legitimate claims.”85 The court held that “like kind
and quality” parts do not necessarily have to be OEM parts.86 The
court stated, “[W]e cannot say as a matter of law that all non-OEM
parts are substandard and that insurers must pay for new OEM
parts in every claim, regardless of the age or condition of the co vered
vehicle prior to the accident or the quality of available non-OEM
parts.”87
IV. THE DEBATE: OEM VS. NON-OEM
The trial court’s decision in Avery was based on the plaintiffs’
claim that “non-OEM parts are generally inferior to OEM parts” and
that “State Farm had breached its ‘promise to the class’” to restore
the vehicles to their preloss condition.88 But the plaintiffs conceded at
trial that they “could not prove that all non-OEM [parts] were
inferior.”89 In turn, State Farm argued that the plaintiffs’ concession
showed that the trial court must determine on a case-by-case basis
whether use of non-OEM parts restored each vehicle to its preloss
condition.90 Rejecting this argument, the trial court spawned further
debate regarding OEM and non-OEM parts.91 Hence, it is important
to determine whether the OEM parts are actually superior to nonOEM parts before deciding whether the plaintiffs’ arguments in
Avery are valid. In determining whether one class of parts is superior
overall, issues of safety, warranty, price, and competition must be
thoroughly examined.
A. Differences Between Non-OEM and OEM Parts
The key difference between an OEM part and a non-OEM part is
the distributor of the part. The automobile manufacturer distributes
OEM parts. For example, Ford Motor Company distributes OEM
Ford parts. A manufacturer other than Ford, such as Keystone
Automotive, may distribute the non-OEM parts for Ford vehicles.
Most automobile manufacturers do not actually fabricate the OEM
parts themselves.92 Instead, they subcontract with independent
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 888.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 15, Avery (No. 88853).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 16.
See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, CLAIMS BULLETIN NO. 99-9, SUBJECT: AFTER
MARKET PARTS (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter, AAI, CLAIMS BULLETIN].
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manufacturers for the fabrication of OEM parts, affixing “genuine
part” labels to them.93 Some of the same subcontractors that
manufacture OEM parts also manufacture non-OEM parts!94
Not only is there a distinction, however superficial, between OEM
and non-OEM parts, there is also a distinction among non-OEM
parts. The Certified Automotive Parts Association (CAPA) is an
independent organization that certifies certain non-OEM parts that
meet specified criteria. CAPA was “established in 1987 to develop
and oversee a test program guaranteeing the suitability and quality
of automotive parts.”95 The yellow CAPA seal on a non-OEM part
signifies that the part is certified to “meet or exceed CAPA Quality
Standards for fit, materials, and corrosion resistance.”96 CAPA’s part
certification program includes manufacturer facility approval,
individual part certification, and random inspections of both facilities
and parts to ensure part quality.97 Since 1992, CAPA has used the
same laboratories as car manufacturers use to test their parts in
order to prove that CAPA-certified parts are of the same quality as
OEM parts.98 CAPA-certified parts account for only 3% of the crashparts sold today while their market share is steadily growing.99
B. Safety
Most OEM proponents have taken the position that non-OEM
parts compromise vehicle safety.100 However, two separate studies by
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) found that nonOEM parts do not affect vehicle safety.101 During one study, IIHS
stripped a 1997 Toyota Camry of its cosmetic parts (fenders, door
skins, and front bumper) and installed a certified non-OEM hood.102
IIHS then performed a forty mile per hour frontal impact crash test,
which yielded positive results.103 Thus, IIHS concluded that a Camry
without the installation of cosmetic parts was as crashworthy as a

93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Certified Automotive Parts Association (Homepage), at http://www.capacertified.
com (visited Oct. 16, 2000).
96. CAPA Overview, at http://www.capacertified.com/about.html (visited Mar. 5,
2001).
97. See id.
98. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54.
99. See Cheap Car Parts Can Cost You a Bundle, CONSUMER REPORTS, Feb. 1999, at
15 [hereinafter Cheap Car Parts].
100. See id. at 2.
101. See INSURANCE INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT: COSMETIC REPAIR
PARTS IRRELEVANT TO SAFETY, 1-6 (2000), available at http://www.highwaysafety.org/
sr.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2001).
102. See id.
103. See id.
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fully equipped Camry with OEM parts.104 An industry spokesperson
reassured that “[t]he cosmetic parts didn’t influence the results.”105
In the other study, which was performed several years earlier,
IIHS performed a thirty mile per hour front-into-barrier crash test on
a 1987 Ford Escort equipped with a competitive replacement hood. 106
The crash-tested car “met and far exceeded all federal
requirements.”107 Specialists at IIHS stated that because the car
withstood the crash without the installation of cosmetic parts, the
parts were “irrelevant to meeting federal safety requirements.”108
C. Warranty Issues
Some opponents of non-OEM parts also argue that the use of nonOEM parts to repair a vehicle voids the manufacturer’s original
warranty.109 This claim is without merit as the federal MagnusonMoss Warrant Act110 ensures that the use of non-OEM parts
generally does not void the warranty on the remaining parts.111 When
considering the Magnuson-Moss Act, legislators specifically
addressed automobile parts. House Report 93-1107 states, “Under
this prohibition . . . no automobile manufacturer may condition his
warranty of an automobile . . . on the use of its own automobile parts
unless he shows that any other . . . automobile parts which are
available . . . will not give equivalent performance characteristics in
the automobile.”112 Consumers are further protected because most
insurance companies offer lifetime warranties for non-OEM parts
used to repair their vehicles. For example, State Farm and GEICO
guarantee non-OEM parts for as long as the insured owns the
vehicle.113
The above discussion suggests that the answer to the debate
regarding whether to use OEM or non-OEM parts is to use both. In
other words, insurers should be allowed to continue using non-OEM
parts to repair damaged automobiles. Consumers apparently reached
the same conclusion on their own. Because Indiana law requires
consent to use non-OEM parts in repairing vehicles, State Farm
104. See id.
105. Id. at 2.
106. See id. at 4.
107. Alliance of Am. Insurers, Test Shows Cosmetic Parts Do Not Affect Safety
Compliance (1999) (promotional material, on file with author).
108. Id.
109. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (1994); see also AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54.
111. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54.
112. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 36, 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,
7719.
113. See What Is an Aftermarket Part?, at http://www.geico.com/infocenter/faqframeset.
htm (visited Mar. 27, 2000).
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conducted a study which found that 93.2% of policyholders consented
to using non-OEM parts on their vehicles.114 Additionally, in a survey
of 1400 State Farm claim files involving estimates with non-OEM
parts, only .59% of policyholders complained.115 Such figures suggest
that both consumers and insurance companies recognize the benefits
of non-OEM parts.
D. Price
1. Parts
Whether CAPA-approved or not, non-OEM parts are significantly
less expensive than OEM parts. The Alliance for American Insurers
(AAI) concluded that OEM parts are on average 60% more expensive
than their certified non-OEM counterparts.116 Appendix A illustrates
the difference between the prices of OEM parts and non-OEM parts
for several makes of automobiles.117
According to Appendix A, OEM parts are consistently more
expensive than similar non-OEM parts. In a few instances, the price
of an OEM part is three times that of a non-OEM part.118 Appendix A
shows that the average cost of an OEM bumper was 43.6% higher
than a non-OEM bumper. The OEM hoods were 63.5% more costly
than non-OEM hoods, and the OEM fenders were 88.3% more
expensive than their non-OEM counterparts. These types of
increased part costs caused State Farm some $4.8 million in losses in
the month following Avery.119 If this trend of using only OEM parts
continues, the heightened cost “will inevitably be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher insurance premiums.”120
If Appendix A were to compare the total cost of a vehicle in
relation to each individual part, the cost gap would further widen. An
AAI study found that purchasing each of the OEM parts required to
assemble a 1999 Toyota Camry would cost over $101,355.121 This
figure does not include the cost of assembling the parts or painting
the car.122 When considering that the retail price of this car is only

114. See State Farm Indiana Policyholders Choose Non-OEM Crash Parts, at
http://www.statefarm.com/insuranc/auto/trialpc.htm (visited Oct. 16. 2000).
115. See Policyholder Complaint Rates with Repairs Involving Non-OEM Crash Parts,
at http://www.statefarm.com/insuranc/auto/trialpcr.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2000).
116. See AAI, CLAIMS BULLETIN, supra note 92.
117. See infra App. A.
118. Note the differences in price between the Chrysler Cirrus and Honda Accord
fenders and non-OEM fenders.
119. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853).
120. Id.
121. See AAI, Rebuilt Camry, supra note 1.
122. See id.

556

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:543

$23,263,123 one may easily conclude that OEM parts are extremely
overpriced.
Insurance companies use non-OEM parts for several reasons. The
most important reason, however, is that non-OEM parts keep costs
down, which in turn keeps insurance premiums down. 124 State Farm,
a mutual insurance company owned by its policyholders, has
traditionally passed these savings along to its customers in the form
of reimbursements.125 It is estimated “that insurance companies are
able to reduce repair costs by approximately $800 million a year by
specifying less expensive non-OEM parts.”126 Although the judge in
Avery did not admit these estimated savings figures as evidence,
State Farm was prepared to show the jury that during the period of
1987 to 1997, it was able to save its policyholders millions of dollars
as a result of non-OEM parts use.127 Here are the figures:

YEAR
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS SAVED
BY THE USE OF NON-OEM PARTS128
$54.7
$65.2
$77.5
$90.3
$107.9
$139.3
$150.3
$190.1
$206.1
$226.8
$233.6

Such savings can only help to foster stabilization of automobile
repair costs and insurance rates.129 There is currently only one
known insurance company, the Interinsurance Exchange of the
123. See id.
124. See E-mail from Bernadette Baltakis, Internet Rep., Progressive Casualty Ins.
Co., to Matthew Rearden (Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author) (“The availability of quality
non-OEM parts encourages competition among parts manufacturers and suppliers and
drives down the cost of auto repairs. When competition is eliminated, prices rise.”).
125. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 17, Avery (No. 88853).
126. Id. at 5.
127. See Premiums Saved by State Farm Mutual Policyholders as a Result of the
Introduction of Competitively Priced Auto Crash Parts, at http://www.statefarm.com/
insuranc/auto/trialps.htm (visited Mar. 31, 2000).
128. See id.
129. See Press Release, National Ass’n of Indep. Insurers, Class Action Lawsuit Battle
over Replacement Parts Expands According to the National Association of Independent
Insurers (Nov. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
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Automobile Club of Southern California, that uses only OEM parts to
repair its insureds’ vehicles.130 Prior to the Avery decision, at least
five other insurance companies (Allstate, Erie, Farmers, State Farm,
and USAA) recommended, but did not require, the use of non-OEM
parts.131
2. Installation
On the other hand, non-OEM parts may require more installation
time than their OEM counterparts. A recent study by Frost &
Sullivan, an independent marketing firm, found that 89% of repair
shops responded that “it takes about two hours longer to install an
imitation part, costing $60 to $90 extra in labor.”132 Improper fit of
the non-OEM parts may cause the longer installation times. At a
recent demonstration at the Collision Industry Conference (CIC), “a
CAPA hood and fender . . . didn’t fit properly on an undamaged 1994
Toyota Camry . . . .”133 CAPA decertified the fender just days before
the conference and decertified the hood on the spot.134 However, three
months later at another CIC demonstration all of the CAPA and nonCAPA parts fit correctly.135 At any rate, to the extent that non-OEM
parts require longer installation, this extra cost would offset some of
the savings from the lower cost of the parts.
E. Competition
One must also weigh the costs of non-OEM installation delay
against the market benefits. Prior to the mid-1970s, automobile
manufacturers monopolized the replacement parts market.136 Before
the introduction of non-OEM parts, automobile companies enjoyed up
to an 800% mark-up on OEM parts sales.137 “Henry Ford is reputed to
have said he’d give his cars away if he could have a monopoly on
selling replacement parts.”138 Indeed, OEM prices decreased after
non-OEM parts introduced competition into the market.139 Appendix

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Cheap Car Parts, supra note 99, at 19.
See id. at 18-19.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
See id.
See id. at 16-17.
See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54.
See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, COMPARISON OF CURRENT COSTS: OEM V.
COMPETITIVE REPLACEMENT PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, CURRENT COSTS] (on file with
author).
138. Id. at 16.
139. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, COST HISTORY COMPARISON: OEM V.
COMPETITIVE REPLACEMENT PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, COST HISTORY] (on file with
author).
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B numerically demonstrates how non-OEM parts competition has
driven down the cost of OEM parts.140
In addition, non-OEM parts ensure better products and prices
through competition. Most advocates of these parts assert that
“allowing competition in the production of crash parts actually helps
ensure quality and safety. Competition forces each individual
company to produce quality parts at a fair market price.” 141 Thus, not
only does using non-OEM parts offer short-term cost savings over
OEM parts but, by supporting the market in non-OEM parts it keeps
down OEM prices, too.
V. SOLUTION: GIVE CONSUMERS A CHOICE
How might insurers craft policies to allow use of both OEM parts
and non-OEM parts—without subjecting themselves to expensive
litigation? The answer is the development of a two-tiered approach to
insurance policies in an area where, traditionally, “there has not
been much of an appetite.”142 To avoid future lawsuits like Avery,
insurance companies offering policies in Florida (and elsewhere)
should offer two types of insurance policies—a “standard” policy and
an “OEM” policy.143 Should the insurance companies decline to offer
the two types of policies, the Florida Legislature should explore
whether to enact legislation requiring Florida automobile insurance
companies to offer consumers a choice.
140. See infra App. B.
141. STEVEN J. SINKULA, CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECONOMY FOUNDATION, CRASH
REPLACEMENT PARTS: AFTER-MARKET OR NO MARKET? (Capitol Comment No. 199, 1998).
142. David Reich-Hale, State Farm Case Spurs Auto Policy Questions, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER (PROPERTY & CASUALTY), Jan. 10, 2000, at 18 (quoting Todd Muller, Assoc.
V.P., Consumer Affs. for the Indep. Ins. Agents of America).
143. Bob Crawford, the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
recently stated that the Avery decision, along with a Consumer Reports article, was a key
factor in a “crackdown on inferior auto crash parts.” Press Release, Florida Dep’t of Agric.
and Consumer Servs., Crawford Launches Crackdown on Inferior Auto Crash Parts (Apr.
14, 2000), http://doacs.state.fl.us/press/04142000html (visited Oct. 7, 2000) [hereinafter
DOACS, Crawford Crackdown]. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services, which regulates Florida automobile repair shops, sent a notice to these shops
requiring that they “maintain documentation whenever an after-market crash part is
installed on a vehicle.” Id. While this practice is consistent with Florida law relating to the
use of non-OEM parts, some insurance industry personnel are concerned with the general
tone of the Commissioner’s statement. See E-mail from Kirk Hansen, Director of Claims,
Alliance of Am. Insurers, to Matthew Rearden (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with author). Any
attempt by insurance companies to force repair shops to use non-OEM parts will now
trigger an investigation by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and a
referral to the Florida Department of Insurance. See DOACS, Crawford Crackdown, supra.
The bottom line is that Commissioner Crawford wants consumers to receive parts that are
equal to OEM parts in terms of quality, fit, and performance. See E-mail from Terry
McElroy, Florida Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs., to Matthew Rearden (Apr. 17, 2000)
(on file with author). This may simply be the starting point for a flood of similar
regulations or “crackdowns” across the country which stem directly from Avery.
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The “standard” automobile policy would essentially be the same as
the typical policy in existence today. But some wording changes may
be advisable in the wake of Avery, such as altering the “pre-loss
condition” guarantee language, which was the crux of the Avery
plaintiffs’ argument.144 For example, insurance companies may
promise to strive for preloss condition, but not go so far as to provide
an absolute guarantee. Another option is to borrow CAPA’s language
and promise to provide “functionally equivalent” parts.145 Consumer
advocacy groups are likely to oppose these changes. Nevertheless,
Avery has left insurance companies with few options.
Insurance companies should, however, also offer consumers an
opportunity to purchase an “OEM” policy, at additional cost, which
would consist of the “standard” policy plus an endorsement. This
endorsement would state that the estimate and repair would consist
of only OEM parts. The cost would be calculated on the fact that
collision repair costs constitute roughly 38-50% of the cost of an
insured’s automobile insurance policy premium.146 While actuaries
would determine the exact amount each OEM policy would cost, the
following is an example of how the new pricing could be developed.
The analysis begins with current insurance rates. On February 9,
2000, three insurance companies in Florida provided quotes for an
insurance policy for a forty-year-old male with a good driving
record.147 The quotes were based on a 100/300/100 policy148 with $500
deductibles for comprehensive and collision coverage. The companies
offered rates for the 1999 Ford Taurus LX, 1998 Dodge Grand
Caravan ES, and the 1997 Honda Accord LX, which were chosen
because of their price diversity, commonality of usage, and different
manufacturers.
Automobile Insurance Premiums149

State Farm

1999 Ford
Taurus LX
$391.48

1998 Dodge
Grand Caravan
$398.56

1997 Honda
Accord LX
$382.72

144. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 15, Avery (No. 88853).
145. Functionally Equivalent? LKQ? Similar? Equal?, CAPA NEWS, June 1999, at 5,
available at http://www.capacertified.org (visited Jan. 15, 2001).
146. See Reich-Hale, supra note 21, at 16 (estimating 40-50%); Wald supra note 55, at
C1 (estimating 38%).
147. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Ferarra, Office of State Farm Ins. Agent Jose
Castillion, Daytona Beach, Fla. (Feb. 9, 2000); Telephone Interview with GEICO Ins. Co.
Rep., GEICO 800 Call Center (Feb. 9, 2000); Telephone Interview with Progre ssive Ins. Co.
Rep., Progressive 800 Call Center (Feb. 9, 2000).
148. Such a policy includes $100,000 of bodily injury coverage per person, $300,000
aggregate bodily injury coverage per accident, and $100,000 property damage coverage.
149. See sources cited supra note 147.
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Progressive

$394.00

$434.00

$436.00

GEICO

$387.20

$428.40

$438.30

Average Premium
Per six months

$390.89

$420.32

$419.00

For demonstration purposes, assume that 44% of the insurance
premiums are allocated for repairs.150 The OEM premium can then be
established with this five-step formula:151
POLICY PRICING FORMULA
“Standard” Policy Cost * Percent Attributable to Repair Damage
(44%) =
Standard Premium Attributable to Damage

“Standard” Policy Cost * Percent Not Attributable to Repair Damage
(56%) =
Standard Premium Not Attributable to Damage

100 * (Total OEM Parts Cost - Total Non-OEM Parts Cost)/Total
OEM Parts Cost =
Average Percentage Difference

150. This estimation is based on policy costs which allocate, on average, 38-50% to
cover damage repairs, as discussed earlier. See Reich-Hale, supra note 21 (estimating 4050%); Wald, supra note 55 (estimating 38%). This percentage will vary based on the
portion of each insurance company’s policy that is dedicated to repairing vehicles.
151. If this formula were actually used, the cost difference between all parts (OEM less
non-OEM) would have to be accounted for on each vehicle make. For the sake of
simplifying explanation, only three major parts were used to calculate the average price
difference between OEM and non-OEM parts.
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(100% + Average Percentage Difference) * Standard Premium
Attributable to Repair Damage = OEM Premium Attributable to
Damage
OEM Premium Attributable to Damage + Standard Premium Not
Attributable to Repair Damage =
OEM Policy Cost
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1999 Ford Taurus LX
$390.89 * 56% = $218.90 (portion of standard policy not attributable
to damage)
$390.89 * 44% = $171.99 (portion of standard policy attributable to
damage)
OEM VS. NON-OEM PART COST DIFFERENCES152
OEM Part

Non-OEM Part

Price Difference

Bumper

$237.60

$190.00

$47.60

Hood

$268.67

$159.00

$110.67

Fender

$136.29

$90.00

$46.29

Total

$642.56

$438.00

$204.56

Based on the above chart, Ford OEM parts are 31.8%
($204.56/$642.56) more expensive than non-OEM parts.

1.318
(increased OEM cost)

$226.68
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

*

+

$171.99

=

(amount attributable
to damage)

$218.90

$226.68
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

=

(amount of premium not
attributable to damage)

$445.58
(OEM premium)

The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1999 Ford Taurus LX
would be $54.69 ($445.58 - $390.89) more than a standard policy for
a six-month period. Annually, insureds defined in this example
would pay an additional $109.38 for an OEM policy.

152. See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137.
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1998 Dodge Grand Caravan ES
$420.32 * 56% = $235.38 (portion of standard policy not attributable
to damage)
$420.32 * 44% = $184.94 (portion of standard policy attributable to
damage)
OEM VS. NON-OEM PART COST DIFFERENCES153
OEM Part

Non-OEM Part

Price Difference

Bumper

$345.00

$256.00

$89.00

Hood

$295.00

$168.00

$127.00

Fender

$132.00

$91.00

$41.00

Total

$772.00

$515.00

$257.00

Based on the above chart, Dodge OEM parts are 33.3% ($257.00/
$772.00) more expensive than non-OEM parts.

1.333
(increased OEM cost)

$246.53
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

*

+

$184.94

=

(amount attributable
to damage)

$235.38

$246.53
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

=

(amount of premium not
attributable to damage)

$481.91
(OEM premium)

The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1998 Dodge Grand
Caravan ES would be $61.59 ($481.91 - $420.32) more than a
standard policy.

153.

See id.
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1997 Honda Accord LX
$419.00 * 56% = $234.64 (portion of standard policy not attributable
to damage)
$419.00 * 44% = $184.36 (portion of standard policy attributable to
damage)
OEM vs. Non-OEM Part Cost Differences154
OEM Part

Non-OEM Part

Price Difference

Bumper

$188.07

$132.00

$56.07

Hood

$332.47

$124.00

$208.47

Fender

$163.54

$52.00

$111.54

Total

$684.08

$308.00

$376.08

Based on the above chart, Honda OEM parts are 55% ($376.08/
$684.08) more expensive than non-OEM parts.

1.55
(increased OEM cost)

$285.76
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

*

+

$184.36

=

(amount attributable
to damage)

$234.64

$285.76
(OEM premium
attributable to damage)

=

(amount of premium not
attributable to damage)

$520.40
(OEM premium)

The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1997 Honda Accord LX
would be $101.40 ($520.40 - $419.00) more than a standard policy.
As the above examples illustrate, the “standard” policy in Florida
would generally be less expensive than the “OEM” policy.155 Of
course, this analysis is cursory and any pricing change or additional

154. See id.
155. For a chart showing the difference in policy prices, see infra app. C.
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policy type would have to be developed by insurance actuaries. Their
calculations would have to account for predicted automobile
accidents, estimated repair costs for the upcoming year, and the
possibility that a monopoly of OEM parts in the repair market could
trigger increased parts costs. This last factor is especially important
due to favorable pricing on non-OEM parts, as shown in Appendix B,
“Cost History Comparison: OEM vs. Competitive Replacement
Parts.”156 Nonetheless, the above analysis illustrates the lower costs
associated with “standard” policies.
The limited analysis shows a range of savings between $54.69 and
$101.40 per six months for purchasing the “standard” policy. If this
analysis were expanded to include parts prices for an entire vehicle,
the increase in an “OEM” policy price would continue to grow. Since
non-OEM parts are not made for each component of the vehicles,
some OEM parts must be used to reconstruct any car. Based on the
recent study by the AAI, the OEM parts cost, on average, is 60%
greater than the non-OEM parts cost.157 In referring to this twopolicy system, one consumer aptly stated, “Those who want the best
should be willing to pay for the best and the rest of us should not
have to subsidize them.”158
As previously mentioned, a two-policy system would require
insurance companies, financial analysts, and actuaries to complete a
more detailed formulation of the “OEM” policies. Each vehicle make
and model should be scrutinized to find the cost difference between
repairing it with OEM or non-OEM parts. When this is completed, a
formula, similar to the one above, would be applied to find the cost of
“OEM” policies. While this tabulation may cost a significant amount
of money in research and development, it should be cost effective for
both insurance companies and insurance consumers in the long
run.159
Additionally, insurance companies and automobile repair shops
would have to ensure that the parts used are in conformity with the
various state regulations regarding the use of non-OEM parts.160
Many of the fifty states currently have some laws concerning the use
of non-OEM parts.161 These laws may require a written estimate
156. Infra app. B.
157. See AAI, COST HISTORY, supra note 139; infra app. B.
158. Letter from W. Paul Mandt, to Nat’l Underwriter (Nov. 29, 1999), at
http://www.nunews.com/archives/pc_archive/1999/p11-29/48letters.asp (visited Oct. 16,
2000).
159. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853).
160. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, STATE LAW GOVERNING AFTERMARKET PARTS
(1999) (on file with author); Reich-Hale, supra note 21, at 18.
161. See ALA. CODE § 32-17A-1 to -3 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-461 (2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-90-301, -302, -307 (Michie 1999); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9875.1 (West
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3-1301 to -1305 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-355 (2000);
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disclosure statement regarding non-OEM parts, written consent by
the insured for use of non-OEM parts, warranty of non-OEM parts by
the insurance company, or a limitation on the type of parts used. For
example, Florida law requires disclosure in all instances where nonOEM parts are used in preparing an estimate for repairs.162
While those statutory requirements would remain even with the
development of an “OEM” policy, the issuance of an “OEM” policy
would eliminate some of the disclosures that must be made with nonOEM parts. In some instances, the mandatory use of non -OEM parts
in insurance companies’ “standard” policies could conflict with those
statutory requirements. That possibility should be explored before
implementation.
The sale and distribution of these two policies must also be
explored. Insurance agents would have to adjust to the “OEM”
alternative. However, what some may view as a potential pitfall
could be a marketing department’s dream. The first few companies to
implement the two-policy system would give their agents an
opportunity to tap into a market of consumers who want only
premium parts for their vehicles.
There is, nonetheless, a very real possibility that the two-policy
system would be rejected by insurance consumers. Most consumers
generally want to pay the least amount of money for the best product
or service. In the insurance world, this translates into the insurance
consumer who desires to pay a low insurance rate and expects his
vehicle to be repaired with what he conceives as the best repair
parts—OEM parts. The potential pitfall lies in the unlikely
FLA. STAT. § 501.33 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-5 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 437B-1, 13, -15 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1328B to -1328D (2000); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.29
(West 2000); IND. CODE. § 27-4-1.5-8 (2000); IOWA CODE §§ 507B.4, 321.1 (1999); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 50-660, -662 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2424 (West 1999); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW § 14-2302 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 90, § 34R (2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 257.1362 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 72A.201, 72B.091 (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6327-1, -3, -5 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.295 (1999); NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 210, §§ 45-002,
-006 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407-D:2 (1999); N.J. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 11, § 11:2-17.3
(2000); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 216.7 (2000); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, r.
4.0425-.0427 (July 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.81 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15,
§ 955 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.292 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-10.2-1, -2 (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-71 (Michie 2000); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 0780, ch. 1-59-.04
(2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.07-1 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-319 (2000);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-510 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6B-1 to -6 (2000); WIS. STAT.
§ 632.38 (2000); WYO. ADMIN. R. & REGS. ch. 19, § 7 (2000).
162. See FLA. STAT. § 501.33 (2000). The disclosure must contain the following
information in a font type no smaller than 10 point:
This estimate has been prepared based on the use of crash parts supplied by a
source other than the manufacturer of your motor vehicle. The aftermarket
crash parts used in the preparation of this estimate are warranted by the
manufacturer or distributor of such parts rather than the manufacturer of your
vehicle.
Id.
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possibility that all consumers would reject the “OEM” policy because
of its increased price. If so, the resources expended in developing this
policy would be spent in vain. However, the companies with these
two-policy systems would avoid lawsuits like Avery because of the
upfront choice. The first company to institute this type of system
would need to take this financial risk.
Experimenting with the two policy types on several of the most
popular vehicles would possibly reduce this risk. Moreover, this fear
could be minimized simply by observing consumer trends. Certain
people only purchase “name brand” products, while others opt for
generic items. Furthermore, consumers who prefer premium parts
will pay for them, and others will select the “standard” policy.
Once all the bugs are worked out, this two-policy system would
benefit both the insurers and the insureds. First, offering two policies
will avoid claims like those in Avery. Insurance companies will be
able to defend such suits on the basis that the insureds agreed to
have non-OEM parts installed on their cars when they chose the
“standard” policy. For this defense to be asserted, it will nevertheless
be necessary to change the language in the policies from
guaranteeing “like kind and quality” parts to language which will
better reflect the policy the insured chose.163 Finally, John Rollins, an
actuary at Florida Farm Bureau Insurance, succinctly summed up
the ramifications of Avery when he stated “it is clear that one side
benefit of all of this is that it will provide incentive for companies to
reexamine [the] products they provide and the consumer friendliness
of the products.”164
VI. CONCLUSION
Even if overturned, Avery has changed the face of automobile
insurance.165 On the one hand, Avery will cause insurance companies
to reevaluate their use of non-OEM parts. On the other hand, Avery
may cause a substantial increase in insurance premiums to offset the
cost of more expensive OEM parts. Whether on the initiative of
insurance companies or the Florida Legislature, the use of two types
of policies may be the answer to the huge question facing the
automobile insurance industry—What do we do in the wake of
Avery?—as well as a long-term win-win solution for consumers.
Consumers who are willing to have their automobiles repaired with
non-OEM parts can continue to enjoy lower premiums while those

163. Avery v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 1022134, at *2 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999), appeal docketed, No. 5-99-0830 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21, 1999).
164. Reich-Hale, supra note 142, at 18.
165. See id.
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who are willing to pay higher insurance rates can ensure their
automobiles are repaired with OEM parts.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of Current Costs:
OEM vs. Competitive Replacement Parts166
Bumper ($)

Hood ($)

OEM
Model
Years
1995-99 198.00

NonOEM
137.00

338.00

NonOEM
196.00

146.00

NonOEM
87.00

1995-99

302.00

209.00

545.00

279.00

272.00

148.00

1995-98 535.00

247.00

295.00

159.00

305.00

95.00

1996-98

345.00

256.00

295.00

168.00

132.00

91.00

1994-98 364.10

290.00

529.28

326.00

245.16

117.00

250.22

140.00

143.85

97.00

129.30

50.00

Ford
Taurus
Honda
Accord
Mazda 626
Nissan
Altima
Toyota
Camry
Chevrolet
1500 PU
Ford
F150 PU
Ford
Explorer

1996-99 237.60

190.00

268.67

159.00

136.29

90.00

1996-97

188.07

132.00

332.47

124.00

163.54

52.00

1993-95 265.75
1994-97 145.40

180.00
116.00

476.50
345.62

180.00
153.00

138.45
183.29

96.00
83.00

1997-99 159.52

121.00

282.48

252.00

194.84

189.00

1988-99

202.38

159.00

299.00

128.00

149.00

77.00

1997-98 235.12

190.00

416.66

260.00

160.02

105.00

1995-97

291.00

350.00

144.00

192.00

79.00

1997-99

371.58

OEM

Fender ($)

Make
Model
Chevrolet
Cavalier
Chevrolet
Lumina
Chrysler
Cirrus
Dodge
Caravan
Ford
Mustang
Ford Escort

166. See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137.
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APPENDIX B
Cost History Comparison:
OEM vs. Competitive Replacement Parts167
Make
Model
Pontiac Grand
Prix Coupe
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender
Toyota Camry
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender
Chevrolet
Caprice
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender
Ford
Thunderbird
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender
Buick Century
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender
Ford Escort
OEM
Fender
Non-OEM
Fender

Model
Year
1991-96

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

309.00 324.00 354.00 364.00 368.00 275.00
171.00 171.00 131.00 124.00 132.00 132.00
1989-95
265.79 259.96 143.88 143.88 143.88 146.47
209.00 104.00

60.00

63.00

77.00

56.00

1991-96
267.00 226.00 238.00 248.00 248.00 248.00
186.00 148.00 153.00 140.00 120.00 102.00
1989-95
205.00 211.15 211.00 211.15 222.76 199.20
166.00 166.00 166.00 166.00 166.00 121.00
1982-96
122.67 129.00 136.00 141.00 141.00 141.00
108.00 108.00 108.00 113.00 113.00

89.00

1991-96
171.45 180.02 180.02 121.55 190.61 190.60
79.00

79.00

167. See AAI, COST HISTORY, supra note 139.

65.00

68.00

79.00

51.00
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APPENDIX C
Comparison of Standard Policy Price and OEM Policy Price168

1999 Ford
Taurus LX
1998 Dodge
Grand
Caravan ES
1997 Honda
Accord

Average
Standard
Policy Price
$390.89

Estimated
OEM
Policy Price
$445.58

Difference in
Price

$420.32

$481.91

$61.59

$419.00

$520.40

$101.40

$54.69

168. See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137; see also supra text accompanying notes
153-55.

